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gasoline	 market.	 The	 main	 purpose	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 investigate	 possible	 long‐run	 price	
leadership	 in	 the	US	gasoline	market	and	 the	characteristics	relevant	 to	a	competitive	market	
using	 the	 vector	 error	 correction	 model.	 After	 examining	 the	 stationarity	 and	 cointegration	
properties	 of	 the	weekly	 gasoline	 prices	 across	 eight	 different	 regions	 of	 the	US	we	 consider	
long‐run	price	leadership	and	parallel	pricing	in	the	framework	of	the	cointegrated	vector	auto‐
regression	(VAR).	In	contrast	with	Kurita	(2008)	the	complete	market	is considered using data on 
901 weekly gasoline prices for the US. The finding of a single common trend has been observed for a 
smaller number of regions, but when the system is estimated across the US it is found that the 
cointegrating rank based on a broader range of prices implies two further common trends. One can be 
associated with at least one weakly exogenous variable and the others to cointegrating exogeneity and 
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In this article we discuss further the developments in the literature previously 
summarized in Hendry and Juselius (2001), Hunter and Burke (2012), Hunter and 













movement.		La Cour and Møllgaard (2002) focused on the appropriateness of a legal 
definition that might be used to define anti-trust behaviour. The focus is on the extent to 
which a firm may be able to operate independently of its competitors. While Forni (2004) has 
approached the problem from a slightly different manner in terms of categorising a market as 




















Much of the earlier empirical literature is well summarized in a report for the United 
Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (OFT) by LECg (1999) where the focus was on price 
correlation and causality. The suggestion being that correlation was an indication of collusion 
(see Maunder (1972)). Further consideration was made of endogeneity by Slade (1986) again 
an indication that certain firms pricing decisions were driving the market. More recently, the 
distinction has been made between the long-run and the short-run. One reason might be that it 
may be easier to encourage a committee or jury that irregularity in pricing in the long-run is 
serious enough to lead to legal action as harm to the consumer. Consumer harm has been 
defined in terms of consumer detriment (see Hunter et al (2001)). Detriment can be measured 
either directly or indirectly, the direct measures relate to the extent of legal activity and 
complaint in terms of the delivery and quality of the product delivered. However, monitoring 
whether the consumer is damaged by corporate inactivity is not as straightforward to 
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determine. Indirect, measures require some notion of cost and this often relates to accounting 
information only available on an annual basis (Hunter et al 2001) and this is a reason for 
Forni (2004) emphasising the use of price information as compared with calculating measures 
of the residual demand curve. Furthermore, short-run behaviour that does not have a 
persistent affect and where harm may balance against occasional benefits may be less 
harmful to the consumer.  
Forni (2004) suggested a typology of tests across market segments to categorize the 
nature of the market. As mentioned above, Forni (2004) considers a number of mechanisms 
to determine whether a market is competitive, but argues that finding the log price proportion 
to be stationary is an effective and efficient approach to determine what he terms a “broad 
market”. To this end Forni (2004) has analysed the extent to which the market for milk across 
Italy can be viewed as being competitive. If the market is not competitive, then prices are not 
adjusting in a long-run sense or there are regional anomalies and then there are strong anti-
trust reasons to limit further concentration in the industry. To this end the market is seen as 
broad when milk pricing in one part of Italy is reflected in the pricing decisions of all the 
other regions and breadth is measured by the extent to which inter-regional price proportions 
are stationary. Forni (2004) emphasises that when the market can be arbitraged, then it is 
competitive and this relates in the long-run to parallel pricing (Buccirossi (2006)). When 
compared with analysing a system of prices via a VAR, Forni (2004) argues that the method 
he applies does not require the log price series to be integrated of order one (I(1)) and the test 
considers jointly stationarity and parallel pricing. Forni (2004) finds limited evidence for 
competitive behaviour and a market that is broad. The analysis is extended by Giulietti et al 
(2010), and Hunter and Tabaghdehi (2013) from the univariate to the panel context to analyse 
market definition in relation to energy prices in UK and US respectively. While Hosken and 
Taylor (2004) provide an extended reply to Forni (2004) by use of an example using gasoline 











La	Cour	and Møllgaard (2002) suggested that it is possible to test the proposition 
commonly used by the European Court of insufficient response to competitors by embedding 
the testing within a dynamic system. While Hendry and Juselius (2001) suggest that parallel 







be	interrelated.	La Cour and Møllgaard (2002) suggested that the argument over the 
capacity to determine competitiveness in a system relates to the extent to which it is possible 
to determine whether there is price reaction across all segments of the market place and in 
addition to the capacity to test exogeneity the VAR permits analysis of price interaction at the 
level of the market. 
                                                     
1 Pesaran and Pesaran (2010) implement the ADF test subject to further stationary variables and then simulate 
the critical values subject to these additional terms, implying the test may be handled without imposing the 
short-run restriction.  
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However, finding N-1 long-run relations that all obey parallel pricing is necessary, but 
not sufficient for an efficient market. This case then corresponds to LEPT (Burke and Hunter 
(2011)), which corresponds to all firms following a target price that depends on all the prices 
across the market. In the case where there are N-1 long-run relations, then there is a single 
stochastic trend and this encapsulates all the demand and supply shocks in the market. In 
essence the single stochastic trend is a random walk and so all past information on prices is 
embodied in this.  
Attention also needs to be paid to long-run exogeneity and the dependencies that this 
engenders. The capacity to investigate long-run causality and conditioning is a key advantage 
to estimation of a system over the approach of Forni (2004). The study by LecG (1999) 
points out that the two primary mechanisms to analyse price relations are defined in terms of 
correlation and causality. It is this that permits us to distinguish between long-run relations 
that suggest agents respond to competitors and the case where a particular firm or sector is 
not responding to the others. A further feature of the systems method is that it permits a 
distinction between parallel pricing and the case where one or more firms are not impacted by 








                                                     
2 The	notion	of	Autoregressive	Conditional	Heteroscedasticity	(ARCH)	relates	to	Engle	(1982)	and	it	was	viewed	in	
initial	studies	as	a	feature	of	nominal	data	as	it	was	first	applied	to	price	data	for	the	UK. 
3 Burke and Hunter (2014) have found similar results for a trivariate model with spectral radius in excess of .85 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Following Hosken and Taylor (2004), and Kurita (2008) we analysed the cointegration 
and exogeneity properties of regional gasoline prices in the US using regional data across the 




























In a bivariate case using gas prices conditioned on a WE oil price, Hendry and Juselius 
(2001) find that competition implies a common trend driving prices across markets and this 
idea is generalized by Hunter and Burke (2007) to a multi-price framework. We pay 
particular attention to the role of the common trend and exogeneity in explaining the 
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	We	may	test	whether	these	series	are	stationary	by	applying	the	Dickey‐Fuller	test	to	
these	residuals	and	this	relates	to	the	following	dynamic	model:	














in	Kremers et al (1992) that the Dickey Fuller (DF) test that is applied by Forni (2004) is a 











                                                     



























                                                     
6 γ	>0	implies	that	variables	are	moving	in	the	wrong	direction	to	correct	for	disequilibrium.	 


























                                                     


















































Following Hendry and Juselius (2001) we consider the conventional VECM, but with eight 
potentially inter-related market prices. 
                                                     
9 See Chapter 5 of Burke and Hunter (2005) for further discussion of weak exogeneity related to sub-blocks of 










Following De Vany and Walls (1999) we consider cointegration as a system and that 
may relate to the more general case of LEPT (Burke and Hunter, 2011). Cointegration across 
the system gives rise to a set of long-run relations that are tested jointly. Furthermore, the 
finding of weak exogeneity can distinguish between parallel pricing and aggressive price 
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0 .252   .222   0 .0 0 .03   0 .025
0 .189     0 .223      0 .0  0 .018    0 .021
 0 .0    0 .182 0 .025   0 .198    0 .077
0 .109 0 .0      0 .0     0 .045    0 .028
0 .187  0 .314  0 .0    0 .0 0 .014
0 .0 0 .0 0 .038     0 .0 0 .0
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11 Company data were analysed, but these results are preliminary. The findings suggest r=N-2, but with a smaller sample and 
volatile price data they are viewed as tentative and for reasons of space and consistency with the above discussion they are 















































































































































































Table 1- Summary of ADF tests, ECM test of regional price proportion. (With intercept and 
no trend) 
Log price differential (q)12 ADF (q)/ OLS t-statistic      ECM (q)/ OLS t-statistic  
PNE-MW (25)       -3.81 * ‐14.48	**|	PMW  
PMW-CA (25) -4.93 * ‐8.70	**|	PCA	  
PMW-EC (25) -4.72 * ‐10.15	**|	PEC	  
PLA-GC (23)    -2.22 ‐5.63	**|	PGC	  
PRM-WC (16) -5.81 * 		‐6.62**|	PWC	  
PMW-GC (20) -3.36* ‐8.46	**|	PGC	  
PGC-RM (16) -5.21* ‐1.22|	PRM	  
PGC-WC (20)  -3.78** ‐2.65		|	PWC	  
PMW-RM (24)    -4.43* ‐3.76	**|	PRM	  
Professionl      Note: Critical value at 1% is -3.44, at 5% is -2.87 computed in 
Oxmetrics Professional (Doornik and Hendry, 2009). * Significant at the 95% 














                                                     
12  q the lag order of each series has been selected by consideration of the maximum lag found via inspection of the 



























































i 1, … , 5
j 1, … , 5	
i j
	
α	3i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
	
χ2(5)	=	5.1254	[0.4008]	
SE	=	(LE)	+	(WE)|	
r=5	
PCA		
	
	
PEC	
	
	
PGC	
	
	
PLA	
	
	
PMW	
	
	
PNE	
	
	
PRM	
	
	
PWC	
α	1i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5
β	j1=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	2i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β	j2=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	3i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β	j3=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	4i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β	j4=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	5i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β	j5=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	6i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β	j6=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	7i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β	j7=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
	
α	8i=	0,	for	i=1,	…,	5	
β j8=	0,	for	j=1,	…,	5	
χ2(10)	=	35.633	[0.0001]**
	
	
χ2(10)	=	20.717	[0.0232]*	
	
	
χ2(10)	=22.520	[0.0127]*	
	
	
χ2(10)	=30.611	[0.0063]	**	
	
	
χ2(10)	=32.287	[0.0004]**	
	
	
χ2(10)	=19.658	[0.0327]*	
	
	
χ2(10)	=49.721	[0.0000]**	
	
	
χ2(10)	=	46.086	[0.0000]**	
Note:	Weak	Exogeneity	(WE),	Long‐run	Exclusion	(LE),	and	Strict	Exogeneity	(SE).	*	significant	
at	the	5%	level	and	**	significant	at	the	1%	level.		
